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Abstract: While freedom of expression has a long and well-established constitutional 
foundation as a self-governing concept, the right to privacy is a relatively recent norm in 
the constitutional orientation of the United Kingdom. Until the Human Rights Act 1998, the 
right to privacy had little standing constitutionally. Following on from this standard-setting, 
notably, both rights have taken on added importance in our modern technological society. 
Nevertheless, the formulation of privacy into a legal doctrine of human rights seems to 
have presented a fundamental tension in relation to freedom of expression. As a matter of 
legal logic, the courts, through a consideration of the law, examine the substantive legal 
issues in terms of a balancing process, whereby the interest in privacy is balanced against 
the interest in freedom of expression. It is a matter of broad principle for the courts to rely 
on injunctions as ancillary instruments of equity in doing justice in this field. Significantly, 
while the elementary norm of an injunction is that it commands an act that the court regards 
as an essential constituent to justice, unfortunately, many contend that judges have gone 
beyond this point, and this is shifting opinions. In fact, serious concerns have been 
frequently expressed about the extent to which the rich are easily able to invoke the 
discretion of the court to grant injunctions in a fashion that remains an antithesis to the 
principle of open justice and also undermines the exercise of freedom of speech. While this 
suspicion is not entirely new to matters of procedural law, the recent case, PJS v News 
Group Newspapers turned on this controversy. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to 
examine the complexity of celebrity privacy injunctions in the age of the internet and 
question its relevance, as we outline the extent to which social media is challenging the 
authority of the state (judiciary) in this direction. 
Keywords: Courts, Freedom of Speech, Human Rights, Injunctions, Privacy, Social Media. 
 
1. Introduction  
International human right instruments, particularly the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHRs),
1
 incorporate two competing rights – the right to privacy 
contained in Article 8 and the right to freedom of expression included in Article 10. 
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The former is often exercised by the press.
2
 As a non-self-executing treaty, which 
normally becomes judicially enforceable through the implementation of legislation, 
the ECHR was codified into the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998.
3
 Subject to the 
proportionality principle and other lawful restrictions Article 8 of the HRA 
provides that, „Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family 
life, home and correspondence‟.4  
It must be noted that the right to privacy has developed recently out of the need of 
a technological civilisation. Moreover, at the EU level, the right to privacy includes 
both privacy (Article 7 of the EU Charter) and protection of personal data (Article 
8 of the EU Charter).
5
 This right finds its authentic expression within the system of 
individual rights.
6
 It has been reasoned that the right to respect for private life 
comprises more than one notion, but includes among other things – „unwanted 
access to private information and unwanted access to [or intrusion into] one‟s … 
personal space‟.7 Within this essence, an individual may apply to the courts to seek 
a remedy to prevent or stop the publication of any material relating to their private 
life.
8
 
In a similar vein, Article 10 of the HRA stipulates that, „Everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression‟. Moreover, at the EU level, the right to freedom of 
expression is included in Article 11 of the Charter.
9
 This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference, and regardless of any major frontiers. As a matter of debate, the 
general policy of Parliament suggests that Article 10 of the HRA right may only be 
qualified in narrowly limited circumstances, subject to certain lawful limitations.
10
 
Those circumstances include national security, public safety, the protection of 
morals, and the protection of the reputation or rights of others.
11
  
Notably, the freedom of the press has an ancient lineage.
12
 The jurisprudence of 
courts even maintains that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential 
foundations of a democratic society.
13
 Without it, many civilised states believe that 
democracy would be no more than a “sham”.14 There are of course manifest 
dangers in any undertaking that aims to subdue the freedom of the press. This 
freedom has long been defended, and the courts emphasised the importance of 
freedom of expression or speech long before the enactment of the HRA.
15
 It 
remains besides the point, however, that much of the private sexual conduct of a 
celebrity might interest the public and help sell newspapers.
16
 This viewpoint is 
non-negotiable. The matter is well put by Lord Lester: „News is a business and not 
only a profession. Commercial pressures push papers to publish salacious gossip 
and invasive stories‟.17 
Unfortunately, as an unintended fashionable consequence, we can see clearly that 
Article 10 of the HRA contrasts sharply with the exercise of the Article 8 right 
alluded to in the framework of the ECHR.
18
 Importantly, both are now vital 
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features of our democratic system despite the fact that Britain‟s proud tradition of a 
free press is in conflict with the right to privacy. The general expectation however, 
is that some compromise between them must be made.
19
 Nevertheless, structuring 
that compromise entails some difficulties and dangers.
20
 Such issues can only be 
properly considered and resolved by judges in individual cases before the courts. 
This is where equity would generally play a key role. Still, while equity has 
become a settled system, one central concern follows that in the exercise of judicial 
discretion, some judges have used injunctions ruthlessly and unjustly.
21
 
Importantly, injunctions are one of the most popular equitable remedies. They 
provide a very good tool for the judiciary to accommodate often conflicting 
interests in order to do justice between the parties.
22
 In fact, injunctions as a matter 
of equitable remedy are discretionary and are decided on established principles 
after careful balancing of the rights of the respective parties.
23
 This means that as a 
matter of legal principle the courts exercise their power to grant an injunctive relief 
judiciously, and only when necessity, just and proportionality exist.
24
 Until the 
decision of the House of Lords in American Cyanimid Co. v Ethicon Ltd,
25
 it was 
generally considered as a matter of legal threshold that an applicant for 
interlocutory relief had to show a strong prima facie case.
26
  
Now, the principle established as an ordinary common law approach is that, if there 
is a serious issue to be tried and the judge thinks that the balance of convenience so 
requires, an injunction should be granted.
27
 From the perspective of legal logic, 
Section 12 of the HRA is the starting point for drawing on the notion of any 
balancing exercise.
28
 Theoretically, and as a matter of legal construction, the 
threshold test in Section 12(3) of the HRA, which applies to an application to 
restrain prior publication, was whether the applicant had established a real prospect 
of success at trial, rather than that success was more likely than not.
29
 It provides 
that special regard is to be had to the right of freedom of expression in any case 
where it is in issue, and the public interest in disclosure of material that has 
journalistic, literary or artistic merit is to be considered.
30
 With its high threshold 
test, the Parliamentary draftsman intended that Section 12 would in principle 
protect freedom of speech.
31
 
While this idea is clear from a jurisprudential position, since to the inception of the 
HRA into the UK legal landscape, there has been an increasing use of injunctions 
as a remedy for the protection of the right to privacy.
32
 Although injunctions have 
always been part of our jurisprudence, the feature that transforms an interim 
injunction into a super-injunction and anonymised injunctions are a recent 
development.
33
 Despite traditionally being the creature of the judiciary, and by the 
Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 39.2(4),
34
 disproportionate use could undermine the 
principle of open justice.
35
 Super-injunctions, as stated, sincerely and in some 
respects carry the “nomenclature of novelty”.36 As a form of interim injunction, a 
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super-injunction not only binds those against whom it is issued, but also any third 
parties who have notice of the injunction, under what is known as the “Spycatcher 
principle”.37  
Third parties served with copies of such an injunction are, under this principle, 
subject to the court‟s contempt jurisdiction, the aim of which is to protect the 
court‟s process against any acts and words tending to obstruct the administration of 
justice, which is a matter of equity.
38
 While a super-injunction is in force, breach of 
its terms, either by those against whom it is issued, or by third parties with notice 
of it, is an interference with the proper administration of justice and a contempt of 
court, which may result in committal, the imposition of a fine or the sequestration 
of property.
39
 That said, an application for an anonymised or super-injunction is 
one to which the principle of open justice applies. An anonymised injunction is an 
interim injunction that restrains a person from publishing information that concerns 
the applicant and is said to be confidential or private where the names of either or 
both of the parties to the proceedings are not stated.
40
  
Until recently the term super-injunction was unknown to the law of England and 
Wales.
41
 Super-injunctions and anonymised injunctions can be analysed as a 
species of anonymity order and a form of privacy order, as well as a species of 
non-disclosure, or anti-tipping-off order.
42
 Significantly, and more broadly, the 
common thesis is that the courts have given too much weight to Article 8 on the 
protection of legally enforceable rights to privacy and confidentiality, and 
insufficient weight to freedom of speech under Article 10.
43
 In other words, the 
suspicion is that the courts are literally banning the press from exercising their 
Article 10 right unfairly and unreasonably.
44
  
While this tension is not entirely new to matters of procedural law, the recent case, 
PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd has attracted much attention and the Supreme 
Court even recognises this controversial development.
45
 This case has turned on the 
old opposing debate between the two competing rights, and has succeeded in 
pushing it further into relatively uncharted territory in the legal discourse. Pending 
hearing at the time of writing, the scope of PJS is relevant in our analysis,
46
 as the 
Supreme Court even concedes in its decision that some may still question whether 
the case merits the weight of legal attention.
47
 Notably, as per the Supreme Court‟s 
decision, the media in England and Wales are literally barred from naming PJS, 
notwithstanding the fact that the celebrity at the centre of this injunction has been 
named on social media and in several other jurisdictions.
48
  
In fact, this is the basis on which the News Group Newspapers applied to have the 
injunction set aside on grounds of “some significant change of circumstances”.49 In 
other words, the protected information had entered the public domain.
50
 As 
Tugendhat J. once reasoned: „it is obvious that if the purpose of this injunction 
were to preserve a secret, it would have failed in its purpose‟.51 The court of appeal 
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granted the application even though in the earlier judgment Jackson LJ. decided 
that there was no public interest in the story being published.
52
 By a majority of 4 
to 1, with Lord Toulson dissenting,
53
 the Supreme Court decided that the Court of 
Appeal had made an error in its legal reasoning,
54
 since it had incorrectly given 
greater weight to the right of freedom of expression than to the competing right to 
privacy.
55
  
Working through the Court of Appeal‟s decision, the Supreme Court stated that the 
former had wrongly stated that the right to freedom of expression deserved greater 
weight in principle, including the availability of the information.
56
 The Supreme 
Court emphasised that neither right has a preference in principle over the other and 
that an appropriate balancing act should be undertaken by the Court to establish 
whether the rights of the proposed publisher or the party wishing to restrain use of 
their private information should prevail, and this is generally a matter of judicial 
principles established by a considerable number of authorities at the highest level.
57
  
The Supreme Court noted that while Jackson LJ gave an impressive and careful 
judgment, he misdirected himself in an important respect when reaching the 
decision to discharge the interim injunction.
58
 Importantly, the court took a much 
more sceptical approach, stating that if Parliament takes the view that the courts 
have not adapted the law to fit current realities, then, of course, it can change the 
law, for instance by amending Section 12 of the HRA.
59
 Moreover, they settled that 
the Court of Appeal had been mistaken in referring to it as having “limited public 
interest”, and in its introduction of that supposed interest into a balancing 
exercise,
60
 when in fact, there was none at all in the case.
61
  
This confounds every legal logic, as the Supreme Court is defying the gravity of 
modern reality, based on the factual notion that the injunction is no longer 
effective, and lacking any force of law, thinking that the publication of the story in 
newspapers in the US, Canada, and even in Scotland would not be sufficient in 
itself to undermine the claim for an enduring injunction on the ground of privacy.
62
 
As the Supreme Court puts it, „An English court has little control over what foreign 
newspapers and magazines may publish‟,63 admitting that „the internet and social 
networking have a life of their own‟.64 The contrast here is the more primitive view 
that the Supreme Court‟s decision is a walking contradiction of the power of social 
media and this convinces very few, even the judges, as to the effectiveness of 
injunctions in a situation where the information injuncted is already in the public 
domain.
65
  
In addition to being compliant with the necessity and proportionality principles, the 
injunction must also be “appropriate”, that is to say, it must be compliant with the 
appropriateness principle. This means that an injunction that is unable to achieve 
its aim, or that is clearly ineffective in achieving it - as would be the case here - 
cannot be deemed appropriate, necessary or proportionate. This development is 
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troubling for the reason that celebrity injunctions may be irrelevant, as the 
jurisdictional reach of the courts in England and Wales is weakened considerably 
given that social media is ramping up its crusade against the judiciary by 
highlighting their displeasure to gagging orders.  
We therefore follow the Supreme Court‟s lead that their decision in PJS will 
probably give rise to further, entirely legitimate, debate on the value of such 
injunctions in the age of the internet.
66
 Therefore, the aim of this paper is to 
examine the complexity of celebrity privacy injunctions and question its relevance, 
as we outline the extent to which social media is challenging the authority of the 
state (judiciary) in this direction. 
 
2. The Evolution of Privacy and Freedom of Expression as Concepts  
Privacy is a sweeping concept that has gathered legal momentum recently.
67
 
Privacy follows the theory of the natural rights argument.
68
 In their famous 1890 
Harvard Law Review article, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis provided a 
sensible analysis and evolutionary justification for the right to privacy.
69
 They 
supplemented natural rights theory with positive law arguments, and concluded 
that there is a strong enough basis for finding a right to privacy in the common 
law.
70
  
The development of the law was inevitable. The intense intellectual and emotional 
life, and the heightening of sensations that came with the advance of civilisation, 
made it clear to men that only a part of the pain, pleasure and profit of life lay in 
physical things.
71
 Thoughts, emotions and sensations demanded legal recognition, 
and the common law enabled judges to afford the requisite protection, without the 
interposition of the legislature.
72
 This reinforced the central thesis advanced by 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis that common law is not static but undergoes 
continuing growth as culture develops. As they put it: „Political, social, and 
economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its 
eternal youth grows to meet the demands of society.
73
 
This followed a recognition that the press was overstepping in every direction the 
obvious bounds of propriety and decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the 
idle, and to satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations, which can only be 
procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle, are broadcast in the columns of the 
daily papers.
74
 Prosser‟s account typifies this point. He, in principle, contends that 
the right to privacy resulted from the „growing abuses of the press and this made a 
remedy upon such a distinct ground essential to the protection of private 
individuals against the outrageous and unjustifiable infliction of mental distress‟.75 
Despite its well-founded legislative possibilities, it is unsurprising, therefore, that 
the theoretical foundations of the right of privacy are relatively unformed and, 
indeed, are the subject of much current controversy.
76
 Philosophers, legal theorists 
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and jurists have spent a great deal of time lamenting the great difficulty in reaching 
a satisfying conception of privacy.
77
 The widespread discontent over 
conceptualising privacy persists even though the concern over privacy has 
escalated into an essential issue for freedom and democracy.
78
 It has been noted 
that „even the most strenuous advocate of a right to privacy must confess that there 
are serious problems of defining the essence and scope of this right‟.79  
The difficulty in articulating what privacy is and why it is important has often 
made privacy law ineffective and blind to the larger purposes it must serve.
80
 In 
strict theory, privacy enables individuals to formulate ideas without public 
scrutiny; it allows people to remove their “public masks” and act differently in 
private; and it enables them to form intimate relationships, including the freedom 
to choose with whom they share their private thoughts.
81
 Essentially, it is aimed to 
support the individual, to protect the core of individuality in relation to the 
collective society.
82
  
Paradoxically, a categorical description of the right to privacy was precisely what 
Cooley first wrote in 1888, that privacy is the “right to be let alone”.83 It is rooted 
in the dignity of the individual human being, and the respect that is therefore due to 
the private sphere or space that belongs to the individual.
84
 In other words, the 
purpose of establishing a right of privacy is to protect certain areas of individual 
autonomy,
85
 identity and intimacy from any intrusion by society at large.
86
 Thus, 
the right to privacy is clearly a vital element in any system of individual rights,
87
 
and has important consequences in preserving human dignity.
88
  
Nevertheless, these brief formulations demonstrate how elusive the concept can be, 
as even judges have called for separate legislation on privacy.
89
 Even if we agree 
on these outlines of a value structure, it must be admitted that we are still some 
distance from having a definite, workable and independent substantive legislation 
on privacy.
90
 This is true, as advocates often fail to supply a unified theory that can 
serve as a foundation for the development of a comprehensive privacy law.
91
  
An understanding of the functions of privacy illuminates a further problem, as a 
strict approach to enforcing the right to privacy will not do justice to freedom of 
speech as an independent right,
92
 although, the courts in principle, have for years 
had a good idea that privacy ought to be given adequate legal protection.
93
 It would 
therefore appear self-evident that the statutory right to privacy should operate to 
prevent any state institution from undermining this fundamental liberty, including 
the press obtaining certain types of information about the private affairs of a 
person.
94
  
This approach would seem to follow from the very nature of the right to privacy - 
protection for the individual against all forms of collective pressure,
95
 except that 
English law historically recognised no right to privacy per se,
96
 but rather a breach 
of confidence.
97
 The absence of a right to privacy was in 1991 confirmed by the 
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Court of Appeal in Kaye v Robertson, which reasoned that the “monstrous invasion 
of privacy”98 of the claimant did not entitle him to any relief in English law.99 Lord 
Hoffmann later confirmed the same proposition.
100
 In reality, and with varying 
scope and function, several statutes protect privacy in particular situations.
101
 A 
general right to privacy was for the first time imported into English jurisprudence 
via the HRA 1998.
102
 
The basis for this development was that the autonomy, identity and intimacies of 
the individual have been put under greater strain by irresponsible journalism.
103
 
The dangers to privacy have been exacerbated not only by the vast increase in 
information assembled but by the availability of that information through modern 
social networks.
104
 With this thinking, the courts have consistently taken the 
position that private information has no social value and they would almost 
certainly conclude that such information was not something that the public needed 
to know.
105
 However, the argument of John Mill challenges this foregoing thought. 
He maintains that even expression that is false has social importance, in that it 
evokes response, stimulates rethinking and otherwise stirs debate.
106
 The claim is 
that anything that is published is by definition “newsworthy” and a “matter of 
public interest.
107
 
Along the same vein as privacy, the constitutional foundations for a free press are 
solidly established.
108
 Never has it been more true that information is power.
109
 In 
some common law jurisdictions, the press has a right expressed as constitutional 
right and the courts have interpreted it as such.
110
 Its origins stem from the 
abandonment of the English censorship laws at the end of the seventeenth 
century.
111
 Press freedom is one of the most fought over rights in the history of 
mankind. Freedom of expression is essential for discovering new truths and thus 
enabling social progress. It allows for the moral and cultural self-development of 
individuals; and it is necessary for the flourishing of a healthy democracy.
112
  
Like privacy its values are rooted in the fundamental structure of our democratic 
culture. It has developed and is reflected in both our way of life and our laws.
113
 It 
is evident from the conceptual underpinnings deducted from the well-established 
legislative history that on a scale involving a balancing process freedom of speech 
would tilt the right to privacy over.
114
 This follows the normative view that the 
vitality of the democratic process itself rests upon citizens having access to 
information.
115
 And the citizenry must depend in large measure upon the capacity 
of the press to discover this information and to disseminate it to the public.
116
  
 
3. The Complex Task of Finding a Balance Between Articles 8 and 10 
The laws around privacy already have a statutory foundation - with equal footing 
as the freedom of expression. The courts have not sought to give precedence to 
either article but rather have interpreted Articles 8 and 10 of the HRA as being 
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rights of equal standing.
117
 Before delving into analytical issues, in 2001 Lord 
Nicholls acknowledged the presumed tension between the interaction of the two 
fundamental rights.
118
 Drawing various strands of case law together, we see that 
judicial opinions often take the approach based on the subjective expectation of 
privacy.
119
 The House of Lords decision in Campbell v MGN Ltd is a good starting 
point.
120
  
There is now a two-stage test for determining cases where an infringement of the 
right to privacy is alleged.
121
 The first element enjoins the court to take a logical 
approach in looking at whether a person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
in the sense that it is protected by Article 8 - taking into consideration all the 
circumstances of the case.
122
 Thus, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test has 
been confirmed as the guiding test.
123
 If that is not so then the claimant‟s case 
fails.
124
 Once a reasonable expectation of privacy is established, the court must 
consider the second stage, commonly referred to as the “balancing exercise”.  
In other words, if there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, the court balances 
the Article 8 rights of the claimant against the defendant's Article 10 rights.
125 
Lord 
Steyn set out the approach: 
First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the 
values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative 
importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. 
Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be 
taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For 
convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing test.
126
 
Under this approach, the court evaluates whether it is necessary in any given case 
to qualify one right in order to protect the other.
127
 There are different degrees of 
privacy; the more intimate the aspect of private life that is engaged, the more 
serious the reasons must be for interference.
128
 They will take into account many 
factors in attributing relative weight to the competing claims. Relevant to the 
balancing exercise are the level of detail and the format of the publication and the 
value accorded by the individual to the privacy of the material.
129
 When these 
factors are entered into a balancing test, the probability is that they will clearly 
produce more favourable results, from the standpoint of the right of privacy, than 
would otherwise be the case if the information concerned the health and sexuality 
of the individual.
130
 This is generally the reasoned legal position.  
However, this stance also faces another difficulty underlined by the technicality of 
the public interest principle often invoked by the press. Here, we see that the worst 
excesses of the balance that the courts ought to find is affected by the operational 
requirements of the public interest, which is sometimes too elastic in terms of legal 
logic. Defining the public interest is not conceptually easy in relation to privacy.
131
 
The general policy of Parliament is that the public interest principle around privacy 
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already has a legislative foundation, and therefore, Parliament failed to recommend 
a statutory definition of the notion of public interest, and is best taken by the courts 
in privacy cases.
132
 The theory of the public interest is mentioned in a number of 
statutes, including ones concerning privacy.
133
  
Thus, if a public interest can be demonstrated in the revelation of private 
information, that will often lead to the courts striking the balance in favour of 
freedom of expression in that case.
134
 This is also the position adopted by the 
European Court of Human Rights.
135
 As gossip in newspapers can help sales and 
thus enable journalism to continue to perform its essential role in a democracy, it 
might follow that the commercial viability of the press should be a factor when 
balancing the public interest in a story against an individual‟s right to privacy.136 
Thus, if newspapers did not exist, issues of public interests would be undermined. 
This is a line of reasoning that has been acknowledged in some cases. Baroness 
Hale of Richmond reiterated that, „one reason why press freedom is so important is 
that we need newspapers to sell in order to ensure that we still have newspapers at 
all‟.137  
In the narrative, Parliament agrees that the media play a vital role in furthering 
public debate, exposing wrongdoing and enhancing democracy.
138
 In an inverse 
assumption, the Rt Hon. Lord Woolf stated that, „the courts must not ignore the 
fact that if newspapers do not publish information which the public are interested 
in, there will be fewer newspapers published, which will not be in the public 
interest‟.139 However, in McKennitt v Ash, the Court of Appeal held that Lord 
Woolf‟s statements in A v B plc. cannot be reconciled with the decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the first Von Hannover v Germany
140
 and so 
„cannot be read as any sort of binding authority on the content of Articles 8 and 
10‟.141 Importantly, one instrument that the courts have in weighing the balance of 
these two competing rights is injunction. 
 
4. Equitable Remedies and the General Principles Governing the Granting of 
Injunctions  
All writers on the subject of equity, regardless of their philosophical persuasion, 
agree that the term “equity” is difficult to define, and the loose use of the term to 
mean fundamental fairness, has resulted in decisions by equity courts whose 
rationale remains hidden when “equity” is offered as the reason for the decision.142 
The legal realists refer to injunctions as a quintessential equitable remedy in the 
administration of justice.
143
 It is simply a court order prohibiting a person from 
taking a particular action or requiring them to take a particular action. The interim 
injunction is one type of injunction that is relevant in this analysis.  
This is simply the imposition of a temporary judicial stay pending full trial.
144
 This, 
it achieves maintaining the status quo prior to trial and judgment, thereby enabling 
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the effective enforcement of substantive rights to take place after the trial.
145
 In 
other words, by their nature, interim injunctions are a separate action within a 
larger claim, but they can be essential in circumstances where a party wishes to 
preserve the status quo until the dispute has been resolved with a view to 
facilitating the administration of justice at the trial.
146
  
Interim injunctions are an important remedy in privacy actions. They are a judicial 
norm that follows the conceptual logic that once information is public, its private 
nature cannot be restored; it is not possible to undo a breach of privacy.
147
 
Preventing a story appearing in the first place will usually be more important to a 
claimant than obtaining damages after the event.
148
 The situation can be contrasted 
with defamation, where injunctions are virtually impossible to obtain,
149
 unless, 
where a claimant‟s reputation may be vindicated by an award of damages.150 
Importantly, the rules of injunctions, like the rules of equity generally, were a 
product of the institution of the Court of Chancery.
151
  
Near the end of the thirteenth century, the equity in the common law courts began 
to decline.
152
 The courts were becoming too rigid, technical and overly formal, as 
they focused more often on the strict letter of the law, and less on equitable 
considerations.
153
 Equity originated in a society where authority counted more than 
democracy, and where the wishes of the powerful counted more than sound 
explanations for judicial action.
154
 Subsequently, this instrument has been a central 
part of the common law for generations, and naturally there exists some tension 
between the two regimes: law ensures strict uniformity and predictability, while 
equity tempers law to offer relief from hardship.
155
  
Equity is powerful and traditionally supplements the common law. In this broad 
sense, equity means the power to adapt the relief to the circumstances of the 
particular case, “individualised justice”, in effect.156 That is, where harm is 
threatened, injunctions would come to be used in equity.
157
 It moderates the rigid 
and uniform application of law by incorporating standards of fairness and 
reasonableness into the judicial process
158
 upon which all legal decisions must be 
based.
159
  
In other words, where the application of the common law would have operated too 
harshly equity will take precedence over the common law, and this is 
predominantly done to achieve what is sometimes referred to as natural justice, or 
more simply speaking, fairness.
160
 Equity came into the legal landscape to correct 
the substantive and procedural deficiencies seen in common law.
161
 An expansive 
equity practice developed as a necessary companion to common law;
162
 although 
they were complementary, law and equity courts each had a distinct procedural 
system, jurisprudence and outlook.
163
 In a broad jurisprudential sense, equity 
means the power to do justice in a particular case by exercising discretion to 
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mitigate the rigidity of strict legal rules. Thus, justice is the hallmark of equity. 
This is the fundamental principle on which equity sits.  
Notwithstanding this, an interim injunctive relief is not a remedy that is 
liberally granted, and a court will always consider any hardship that the parties will 
sustain due to the granting of or refusal to grant such a remedy.
164
  For the greater 
part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, applicants for interim injunctions 
had to meet the test laid out in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd. 
The first is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that 
if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the 
plaintiff will be held entitled to relief. Importantly, the second inquiry is whether 
the inconvenience or injury which the plaintiff would be likely to suffer if an 
injunction were refused outweighs or outweighed by the injury which the 
defendant would suffer if an injunction were granted.
165
 
The requirement enunciated above attracted William Williamson Kerr attention in 
1888, who in his so-called “A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Injunctions” 
argued that „The Court must, before disturbing any man‟s legal right, or stripping 
him of any of the rights with which the law has clothed him, be satisfied that the 
probability is in favour of his case ultimately failing in the final issue of the suit‟.166 
That threshold test was altered by the House of Lords in the seminal case of 
American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd.
167
  
One of the overarching principles engendered to determine whether an interim 
injunction is an appropriate and permissible remedy is the likelihood of irreparable 
harm to the claimant in the absence of an injunction.
168
 Lord Diplock placed these 
overarching principles into the substantive guidelines for establishing whether an 
applicant has an adequate case for the granting of an interim injunction.
169
 In 
applying the broad principles set out in the American Cyanamid case, the court is 
enjoined to consider whether there is a serious issue to be tried, whether damages 
would be an adequate remedy, where the balance of convenience lies, and any 
other special factors.  
 
5. Discretion in the Context of Equity under Section 12 of the Human Rights 
Act 
The notion of an injunction as equitable relief is discretionary, and that discretion is 
commonly exercised by the High Court in the light of all of the circumstances of 
the case.
170
 The term “discretion” when used in the context of equitable relief 
means “principled discretion”.171 It is a sound judicial discretion that is governed 
by the settled rules of equity.
172
 In addition to the exclusive and auxiliary 
jurisdictions of equity to order injunctions, the courts were granted discretion via 
the conduits of a statutory enactment in the Judicature Act 1873 for that purpose. 
For the sake of legal certainty, Section 25(8) provided that:  
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An injunction may be granted or a receiver appointed by an interlocutory order of 
the court in all cases in which it shall appear to the court to be just or convenient 
that such order should be made; and any such order may be made either 
unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the court thinks just.
173
 
While many would applaud equity for its flexibility to award individualised justice, 
it is also the case that no system of jurisprudence can escape completely the curse 
of discretion, as the exercise of good intentions in equity will not generally 
guarantee an equitable result.
174
 Simply put, a legal system of open-ended 
discretion with no standards is an open invitation for judges to reach decisions 
based on nothing more than their attitudes, predilections and biases, without 
analysis and the constraints of legal rules and principles.
175
  
There were concerns during the passage of the Human Rights Bill 1997-1998 
regarding how the courts might interpret the right to privacy without further 
guidance.
176 
There was unease about the effect on the media if injunctions were too 
readily obtainable, leading to the media not pursuing stories that may be in the 
public interest for fear of having to defend an injunction issued on them. Notably, 
in the House of Lords the then chairman of the Press Complaints Commission, the 
Rt Hon Lord Wakeham, moved an amendment that aimed „to stop the development 
of a common law of privacy‟.177 This move was instantly attacked. Replying to the 
debate on it, the Lord Chancellor, the Rt Hon Lord Irvine of Lairg, said: 
I repeat my view that any privacy law developed by the judges will be a better law 
after incorporation of the convention because the judges will have to balance and 
have regard to articles 10 and 8, giving article 10 its due high value. What I have 
said is in accord with European jurisprudence.
178
 
 
6. The Normative Principle Behind Section 12 of the Human Rights Act 
In response to the fierce debate Parliament introduced Section 12 of the HRA.
179
 
Section 12(3) requires the courts to grant interim injunctions only when „satisfied 
that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed‟.180 
That is a higher threshold and the courts are technically freed from the fetter by the 
House of Lord‟s decision in American Cyanamid‟s case, where the court must be 
satisfied that the claim „is not frivolous or vexatious; in other words, that there is a 
serious question to be tried‟.181 The courts have interpreted this as meaning that the 
applicant will usually have to demonstrate that they are “more likely than not” to 
succeed at trial.
182
 Guidance on the application of Section 12(3) is set out in Cream 
Holdings Ltd v Banerjee.
183
  
This guidance is further reinforced by the Master of the Rolls‟ committee, which 
sought to tighten up the procedures for granting anonymised and super-injunctions, 
by ensuring that they were granted only when strictly necessary, and 
recommending that a Practice Guidance be issued on the approach to them.
184
 The 
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legal background against which Section 12 of the HRA has to be interpreted is 
empirically familiar. In the 1960s the approach adopted by the courts to the 
granting of interim injunctions was that the applicant had to establish a prima facie 
case.
185
 The judge had to establish this before questions about the so-called 
“balance of convenience” were considered. A prima facie case was understood, at 
least in the Chancery Division, as meaning that the applicant must establish that as 
the evidence currently stood on the balance of probability he would succeed at the 
trial.
186
  
Under its purposive reading from the Parliamentary draftsman perspective, one 
could conceive that Section 12(4) of the HRA was thought to make clear that 
freedom of expression should normally take precedence over the right to privacy.
187
 
Recalling the debate during the introduction of the Section 12 amendment in 1997-
1998, this understanding becomes clear. Jack Straw MP argued in the House of 
Commons that „it is intended overall to ensure ex parte injunctions are granted only 
in exceptional circumstances. Even where both parties are represented, we expect 
that injunctions will continue to be rare, as they are at present‟.188  
Significantly, as a matter of empirical logic, Parliament has adopted a report that 
has tended to produce a conclusion that is the opposite to the foregoing 
understanding. Parliament maintains that it does not think that the provisions of 
Section 12(4) of the HRA do not require the courts to „have particular regard to the 
importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression‟ when considering 
whether to grant any relief, meaning that Article 10 has precedence over Article 
8.
189
 This is a stark deviation from the concerns raised during the Parliamentary 
debate on the Human Rights Bill 1997-1998.
190
 The concerns have morphed into 
operational difficulties and we are somehow witnessing that the application of 
Section 12 is without controversy, as the interpretation adopted by the courts fails 
to achieve the purpose underlying its validity.  
The thinking is that the courts are undermining the essential requirements of 
Section 12 of the HRA, and have been too willing to grant injunctions, especially 
anonymised or super-injunctions, or had granted them in the wrong circumstances 
– directly impacting on media coverage of issues of legitimate public interest.191 
Admittedly, under English law exceptions are allowed. CPR 39.2(3)(g) states that a 
hearing may be in private if the court considers that this is necessary in the interests 
of justice.  
Other sub-rules list the following situations as justifying curbs on publicity: where 
publicity would defeat the object of the hearing; where the hearing involves matters 
relating to national security; where it involves confidential information that may be 
harmed by publicity; where it is necessary to protect the interests of a child or a 
protected party; or where an application is made without notice and it would be 
unjust to any respondent for there to be a public hearing. Finally, CPR 39.2(4) 
  
  
Manu, T., Moreno, F.R. (2016) 
Is Social Media Challenging the Authority of the Judiciary? Rethinking the Effectiveness of Anonymised and Super 
Injunctions in the Age of the Internet 
 
DE GRUYTER 
OPEN 
Journal of legal studies Volume 18 Issue 32/2016 
ISSN 2457-9017; Online ISSN 2392-7054. Web: publicatii.uvvg.ro/index.php/jls. Pages 39-87  
 
53 
states that the court may order that the identity of any party or witness must not be 
disclosed if it considers this necessary in order to protect the interests of that party 
or witness. 
 
7. The Principle of Open Justice and the Issue of Anonymised and Super-
injunctions 
As these foregoing procedural provisions show, there are circumstances in which 
publicity may be cut down. However, they also suggest that some degree of 
transparency must be maintained because the exceptions mentioned in the rules 
envisage only limited or partial derogation from publicity.
192
 This is where the 
doctrine of open justice builds up a coherent and transparent body of principles that 
the court must follow. The proper approach to anonymisation has been clarified by 
the Court of Appeal.
193
 The trend towards anonymisation has been deprecated by 
the Court of Appeal in the context of interim injunctions in proceedings to protect 
private information.
194
  
A sceptical viewpoint is that both super-injunctions and anonymised injunctions 
represent a new extension of established forms of anonymity, privacy and non-
disclosure orders developed beyond their previous historical limits, as the currency 
of these judicial instruments appears to harm the just operation of the doctrine of 
open justice.
195
 The most popular claim is that the term “equity” is often 
misunderstood and, as a consequence, often misapplied by courts when they are 
asked to grant an equitable remedy such as injunctions.
196
 To this end, many who 
believe in the doctrine of “rough justice” think that judges are misusing injunctions 
and producing rough justice. To put this in a proper context, there is always the 
question regarding “the balance of the risk of doing an injustice”. 197 Lord 
Hoffmann puts it as follows: 
The principal dilemma about the grant of interlocutory injunctions, whether 
prohibitory or mandatory, is that there is by definition a risk that the court may 
make the „wrong‟ decision, in the sense of granting an injunction to a party who 
fails to establish his right at the trial (or would fail if there was a trial) or 
alternatively, in failing to grant an injunction to a party who succeeds (or would 
succeed) at trial.
198
 
In the recent past, super-injunctions and anonymised injunctions have been more 
widely used than is strictly necessary. They are a controversial development, owing 
to the extent to which they depart from open justice. They are divisive for another 
reason, namely that they are the most obvious form of the recent development of 
the substantive law of privacy as a consequence of the enactment of the HRA.
199
 
As Lord Rodger observed, this mechanism, which was properly only exceptional, 
has become “a widespread phenomenon”.200 Moreover, Lord Woolf MR took this 
further when he once said: „The need to be vigilant arises from the natural tendency 
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for the general principle to be eroded and for exceptions to grow…‟.201 
Additionally, Professor Zuckerman notes: „What the English administration of 
justice has not allowed is for the entire legal process to be conducted out of the 
public view and for its very existence to be kept permanently secret under pain of 
contempt‟.202  
Following this primary disagreement that super-injunctions and anonymised 
injunctions impact on open justice and are an affront to fundamental fairness, the 
Attorney General on 23 May 2011, announced to the House of Commons that a 
joint committee would be established to consider the operation of the law 
concerning privacy and injunctions.
203
 This move follows the concern about the 
erosion of the principle of open justice, which is a long-established and 
fundamental aspect of our justice system and of any liberal democracy committed 
to the rule of law. As a general proposition, the operation of the default mechanism 
of justice demands that hearings are carried out in public.
204
  
 
8. The Empirical Significance of the Principle of Open Justice in the Judiciary 
Besides equity, common law also supports the doctrine of open justice. Thus, it has 
been a central principle of the common law system since its origins that justice is 
conducted, and judgments are given, in public.
205
 The cardinal importance of open 
justice is demonstrated by the provisions of Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.
206
 This principle is, as Lord Shaw described it „a sound and very 
sacred part of the constitution of the country and the administration of justice. . 
.‟.207 Open justice is of constitutional importance because it is „on the whole, the 
best security for the pure, impartial, and efficient administration of justice, the best 
means for winning for it public confidence and respect‟.208 To give the notion of 
open justice a statutory backing Section 67 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 states: 
„Business in the High Court shall be heard and disposed of in open court except in 
so far as it may, under this or any other Act, under rules of court or in accordance 
with the practice of the court, be dealt with in chambers‟.209 
The empirical significance of the open justice norm is that it is not only an aspect 
of freedom of speech but rather it is also an aspect of the principle that justice is 
both done and seen to be done.
210
 Similarly, it has been held that it is a centrally 
important way of ensuring that the court fulfils its constitutional duty of ensuring 
that justice is done.
211
 A strong point in favour of this theory is that it supports the 
rule of law in a democratic society.
212
 The European Court of Human Rights has 
similarly recognised the publicity of court proceedings as fundamental for the 
protection of litigants from the abuse of procedural rights, which, in conditions of 
secrecy, may go unchecked.
213
  
With a similar disposition, Professor Zuckerman maintains that transparency of 
court proceedings reduces the scope for ill-informed and malicious criticism of 
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judicial decisions, thereby protecting the judiciary itself from obloquy.
214
 While we 
do no seek to run down the value of the judicial system, it is also the case that 
super-injunctions and anonymity orders may run the risk of unintentionally 
encouraging suspicion and gossip in relation to innocent third parties.
215
 Indeed, 
there is credibility in the point that such speculation could be even more damaging 
than if no injunction were to be granted at all.
216
 By bringing in the moral, social 
and legal issues, open justice promotes public debate, which is so important to the 
democratic shaping of the law.
217
 This can promote confidence, and that can only 
be maintained and thrive where the administration of justice is transparent, 
comprehensible and accountable.
218
  
Importantly, while the principle of open justice is a fundamental constitutional 
principle, it is not an absolute principle.
219
 Super-injunctions and anonymity orders 
can only ever be exceptional and can only be justified on grounds of strict 
necessity.
220
 Parliament takes the position that departures from the principle of 
open justice should be exceptional and should only happen when they are 
essential.
221
 This position is enhanced by the fact that derogations from the general 
principle can only be justified in exceptional circumstances,
222
 when they are 
strictly necessary as measures to secure the proper administration of justice.
223
  
That is, general principles can never be used habitually.
224
 
The basis for any claimed restriction ultimately rests on a judicial assessment, and 
the judge must first be satisfied that the facts and circumstances of the case are 
sufficiently strong to justify encroaching on the open justice rule.
225
 As already 
stated, derogations should, where justified, be no more than strictly necessary to 
achieve their purpose. The general rule is that the court is not exercising a “wide 
discretion” when deciding to grant derogations made under CPR 39.2(3)(g), or 
under any other part of CPR 39(2).
226
 A point made is that it is a “matter of 
obligation” if it is justified once the court has applied the relevant test.227 
 
9. Social Media in the Age of the Internet 
Social media are a recent invention. The development of the internet has helped 
propel social media as an open platform shared by all. The two most popular social 
networking sites, Facebook and Twitter, were founded in 2004 and 2006 
respectively. They may be relatively new, but they are certainly big. 1.2 billion 
people regularly use Facebook, and 34 million of them are in the UK; 255 million 
regularly use Twitter, and 15 million of them are in the UK.
228
  In addition to these 
well-known providers, there are many other social media forums, based all over the 
globe, with different focuses of activity including LinkedIn; YouTube; WhatsApp; 
Snapchat; Instagram and Pinterest - all with the purpose of “social networking”, of 
connectivity - enabling people to express themselves and interact using the 
internet.
229
 Taken together, these social media platforms are likely to contain 
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hundreds of millions of communications every day. For example, there are 500 
million “tweets” a day.230  
New media have greatly increased the range and availability of information 
sources; in addition, technological developments have allowed citizens to become 
“publishers”.231 That is, „the Internet has now become one of the principal means 
by which individuals exercise their right to freedom of expression and information, 
providing as it does essential tools for participation in activities and discussions 
concerning political issues and issues of general interest‟.232 Consequently, anyone 
can make his or her views known to the world, or can break their own news.  
Additionally, in the light of its „accessibility and its capacity to store and 
communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in 
enhancing the public‟s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of 
information in general‟.233 This has obvious benefits for freedom of expression - 
the role of Twitter in fostering the exchange of ideas and the organisational 
capability that led to the Arab Spring, for example, is widely documented.
234
 The 
internet allows those who have competing views to give effect to them, and to 
publish information that would not ordinarily be published in traditional media.
235
  
The Court‟s Grand Chamber confirmed the understanding that „user-generated 
expressive activity on the Internet provides an unprecedented platform for the 
exercise of freedom of expression…‟.236 Importantly, along the same line of 
reasoning, the French Constitutional Council has affirmed that „in the current state 
of means of communication and given the generalised development of public 
online communication services and the importance of the latter for the participation 
in democracy and the expression of ideas and opinions, this right (to freedom of 
expression) implies freedom to access such services‟.237 
As the AG noted in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) case of Google v Spain 
(C-131/12) „the internet has revolutionised our lives by removing technical and 
institutional barriers to dissemination and reception of information… These benefit 
consumers, undertakings and society at large‟.238 Moreover, in the same decision 
the AG explained that: „The internet magnifies and facilitates in an unprecedented 
manner the dissemination of information‟.  
Confirming the empirical logic, it was similarly contended that, as „the invention of 
printing in the 15th century enabled reproduction of an unlimited number of copies 
that previously needed to be written by hand, uploading of material on to the 
internet enables mass access to information which earlier could perhaps only be 
found after painstaking searches, and at limited physical locations. Further 
explanation of the revolutionary nature of the internet is that „Universal access to 
information on the internet is possible everywhere, with the exception of those 
countries where the authorities have limited, by various technical means (such as 
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electronic firewalls), access to the internet or where the access to 
telecommunications is controlled or scarce‟.239 
 
10. The Law of Contempt in the Age of the Internet 
Equity acts in personam, they say. That is, courts of equity have coercive powers to 
hold a violator in contempt through contempt proceedings where his actions are in 
breach of any judicial order tending to interfere with the course of justice.
240
 
Several statutory provisions explicitly prohibit the disclosure of injuncted 
information. Importantly, Section 2 of the Contempt Act 1981 identifies that the 
publication of a story can impede or prejudice injunctions. This is well-grounded in 
law and within the purview of CPR Part 81 also supported by Practice Direction 
81.
241
 Section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988,
242
 and Section 127 of 
the Communications Act 2003
243
 also hint that such disclosure or comments on 
injuncted information creates the potential that a very large number of cases could 
be prosecuted before the courts.  
The notion of strict liability applies to contempt. However, under normal 
circumstances, a person is not guilty of contempt unless he can be charged with 
knowledge of the injunction.
244
 Contempt follows the principle of quasi-criminal 
proceedings. Lord Hoffmann has a clear view on this. It is inherent in his opinion 
that: „The only means available to the court to enforce its order is the quasi-
criminal procedure of punishment for contempt‟.245 It is entirely appropriate that as 
a consequence of committal for contempt of the court the obligation to be 
specifically enforced be sufficiently certain and precise so as to make the 
defendant‟s duty, in complying with the order, clear.  
Notably, injunctions, where appropriately granted, are necessary to protect 
individual privacy; indeed, they are often the only means of protecting it.
246
 If 
injunctions are to provide adequate protection, it is essential that there are no 
avoidable barriers to their enforcement. However, the test of equitable jurisdiction 
has long been whether the law courts can provide “plain, adequate and complete” 
relief.
247
 Implicit in the notion of an injunction is something that predominantly 
involves „a judicial process operating in personam, and requiring the person to 
whom it is directed to do or refrain from doing a particular thing‟.248 This is 
important, as the expanding role of equity in the broader administration of justice 
pursuant to injunctions has always been controversial and questioned.
249
  
It has been suggested that the single most effective measure for enforcing an 
injunction that had been widely flouted would be for the Attorney General to bring 
an action for contempt.
250
 That is, the Attorney General in his role as “guardian of 
the public interest” can bring proceedings for contempt of court.251 To do this, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) has also published guidelines for the 
application of the current statute law to prosecutions involving social media 
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communications.
252
 However, the question is whether the notion of public interest 
demands that the Attorney General spends public funds to enforce contempt arising 
originally and directly from civil litigation.
253
 Parliament does not share this view 
and has adopted a contrary position in principle. It maintains that: 
The Attorney General should be more willing to exercise his power as Guardian of 
the Public Interest to bring actions for civil contempt of court in respect of 
breaches of injunctions online. The threshold for him intervening should be lower. 
Such action would provide a strong deterrent against future such breaches.
254
 
 
11. The Difficulty of Enforcing Injunctions in the Age of the Internet 
Court orders and statutory prohibitions can apply to those communicating via 
social media in the same way as they apply to others. Accordingly, any 
communication via social media that may breach a court order or a statutory 
prohibition should be considered under the relevant legislation.
255
 The DPP‟s 
guidelines provide that prosecutors should make an initial assessment of the 
content of the communication and the conduct in question so as to bring 
proceedings.
256
 
Lord Advocate Frank Mulholland, in examining whether messages posted on social 
media should be treated as a crime, said the test was simple: „If it would be illegal 
to say it on the street, it is illegal to say it online‟.257 However, the Lord Advocate 
may have forgotten the herculean task of enforcing injunctions in the age of the 
internet. The DPP acknowledges this difficulty. In fact, Section 3 of the Contempt 
Act 1981 provides an absolute defence of innocent publication or distribution. It 
stipulates that: 
A person is not guilty of contempt of court under the strict liability rule as the 
publisher of any matter to which that rule applies if at the time of publication 
(having taken all reasonable care) he does not know and has no reason to suspect 
that relevant proceedings are active. (2) A person is not guilty of contempt of court 
under the strict liability rule as the distributor of a publication containing any such 
matter if at the time of distribution (having taken all reasonable care) he does not 
know that it contains such matter and has no reason to suspect that it is likely to do 
so. 
Moreover, according to the DPP‟s guidelines, there is the potential for a chilling 
effect on free speech and prosecutors should exercise considerable caution before 
bringing charges under Section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and 
Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003. The caution proceeds from the 
standpoint that since both provisions will often engage Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, prosecutors are reminded that these provisions must 
be interpreted consistently with the free speech principles in Article 10.  
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Accordingly, the DPP retreats from this position by maintaining that no 
prosecution should be brought under Section 1 of the Malicious Communications 
Act 1988 or Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 unless it can be shown 
on its own facts and merits to be both necessary and proportionate.
258
 A 
prosecution is unlikely to be both necessary and proportionate where the content of 
the communication did not obviously go beyond what could conceivably be 
tolerable or acceptable in an open and diverse society that upholds and respects 
freedom of expression.
259
 
Consequently, the DPP then reminds prosecutors that the mere fact that words were 
irritating, contentious, unwelcome and provocative is not enough to justify the 
invocation of the criminal law unless they tended to provoke violence.
260
 In a 
similar vein, in Dehal v CPS, Moses J, referring to Section 4A of the Public Order 
Act 1986, held that: „.. the criminal law should not be invoked unless and until it is 
established that the conduct which is the subject of the charge amounts to such a 
threat to public order as to require the invocation of the criminal as opposed to the 
civil law‟.261 There is a high threshold that must be satisfied before the evidential 
stage in the Code for Crown Prosecutors is met.
262
  
Furthermore, at a more practical level, in terms of the injunction‟s effectiveness, 
court orders and statutory prohibitions could in principle oblige that social 
networking sites such as, Facebook or Twitter had in place a number of technical 
solutions designed to prevent users from bypassing the injunction. Firstly, these 
sites might be required to adopt a notice-and-takedown system whereby anyone 
could notify the operators of such platforms of user comments which are 
supposedly in breach of the injunction by bringing it to the operators‟ attention.  
Secondly, another technical solution may be, for instance, the adoption of an 
automatic word-based filtering measure designed to block Facebook‟s comments 
and tweets. Practically speaking, this filtering software looks for key words that 
have previously been added to a list of forbidden words and then once a forbidden 
word is detected such a word is filtered out and blocked. However, the practical 
aspect of this technology is suspect, not to mention it legal shrewdness. Notably, as 
filtering software cannot appropriately differentiate between illegal and legal 
content thereby leading to the blocking of legitimate speech (over-blocking), in the 
copyright context this technology was deemed unlawful by the CJEU in the cases 
of SABAM v Scarlet (C 70-10) and SABAM v Netlog (C 360-10).  
At this point, we could add that whatever technical solution that is used in order to 
make the injunction as effective as possible, under Articles 8, and 10 of the ECHR, 
such a measure must be compatible with the ECtHR three-part non-cumulative test. 
In others words, firstly, the adoption of the injunction must be „in accordance with 
the law‟; secondly, it must pursue one or more legitimate aims included in Articles 
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8 and 10 ECHRs; and finally, it must be „adequate‟, „necessary‟ and 
„proportionate‟ to achieve those aims.  
 
12. Jurisdictional Limit of the Courts in the Age of the Internet  
It is well-established that the court‟s jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief is without 
limit, and (can) be exercised either in support of any legal right, or in the creation 
of a new equitable right, as the court (thinks) fit in the application of equitable 
principles.
263
 Jurisdiction rests either on the inherent authority of the court or the 
statutory conferral of powers to aid the operation of the courts in terms of fairness 
and the protection of justified expectations.  
The normative principle underpinning procedural law teaches us that the High 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction. This position charts the conventional wisdom 
that the judiciary everywhere has the authority to apply some laws extraterritorially 
to enforce foreign judgments.
264
 In fact, there seems to already be an adequate legal 
foundation in state practice, and scholarly consensus on this is strong, except that 
the question of jurisdiction has always been one of intrigue to both lawyers and 
even the general public. Morgan‟s case is one of the earliest cases on the 
enforcement of foreign rulings pursuant to equity.
265
 Moreover, Houlditch v. 
Marquis of Donegal confirmed the possibility of enforcement of foreign judgments 
as a principle of equity.
266
  
Giving its reasoning, in Houlditch v. Marquis, the House of Lords stressed that the 
Court of Chancery had jurisdiction to enforce foreign judgments because it could 
examine whether the judgments were rightly made.
267
 The basis for this jurisdiction 
is sound and straightforward in theory. Its analytical approach carefully follows the 
legal principle of comity of nations.
268
 Ulrich Huber was one of the first to use the 
comity of nations to explain why it was appropriate for a sovereign nation to 
enforce a foreign judgement.
269
  
This doctrine was meant to repair the incorrect but widely shared conceptual view 
that a judgement is valid only within the territorial boundaries of the court in which 
it was rendered.
270
 Despite the lack of academic agreement as to whether comity of 
nations is a rule of law at all,
271
 the argument underpinning the principle of comity 
of nations generally proceeds according to the classical doctrine of what is 
generically known as “legal obligation”. Traditionally, this is a judicially created 
doctrine of English law, which says that if a legal obligation is created by a foreign 
court in a competent jurisdiction it is proper that the judgement must be enforced 
and obeyed everywhere.
272
  
From the English jurisprudence perspective, comity only affirms our confidence 
that there is an obligation to obey the law.
273
 The liberal interpretation of the 
principle sustaining the doctrine of legal obligation is stated nowhere better than in 
the following words of Lord Blackburn, who observed in Godard v Gray that the 
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principle of the law of nations dictates that „a state is bound to enforce within its 
territories the judgment of a foreign tribunal‟.274 In other words, from the moment a 
judgement is issued and a legal obligation is created, it must be enforced 
everywhere.  
The first evidence outside England and Wales of this legal doctrine is found in 
Russell v Smyth.
275
 A US court first adduced the comity of nations as the 
theoretical basis for recognition of a foreign judgement in Guyot v Hilton.
276
 In its 
logical deduction, while the foregoing principle would provide a fluid approach to 
judicial integrity, two principled questions would operate to render the application 
of the doctrine of legal obligations and comity of nations in enforcing foreign 
rulings highly redundant.  
The first concerns the question of conflict of laws; and the second concerns the 
court‟s own initiative to willingly exercise jurisdiction over foreign judgements.277 
From a practical perspective, these two preceding questions are inherently 
connected. Upon the basis of the second, the assumption will generally maintain its 
hold that as a general rule laws have no effect or force beyond the borders of the 
sovereignty from which their authority derives.
278
 That is, international law limits a 
country‟s authority to exercise jurisdiction in cases that involve interests or 
activities of non-residents.
279
 
From the perspective of legal pluralism, it is clear that in the age of the Internet the 
court‟s jurisdiction over the enforcement of a foreign judgement is premised on 
wishful thinking, as there can be practical difficulties in asserting some degree of 
certainty in this area. In the main, these difficulties are due to the cross-
jurisdictional nature of the Internet, as well as the capacity for anonymous posting 
from internet service providers that do not easily identify their end-user.
280
 As one 
author has recently put it:  
The Internet‟s challenge to traditional concepts of jurisdiction and governance is 
multifaceted, but really boils down to two factors. First when you‟re online, you‟re 
both everywhere and nowhere at once. Ubiquity is perhaps the defining 
characteristics of this remarkable new “borderless” medium. There are no 
passports on the Internet; you travel freely from one destination to another at the 
click of a button. And geography is a remarkably meaningless concept for Internet 
denizens. . . Second, no single entity or country owns or controls the Internet. 
Persons of this so-called „network of networks‟ are owned by private companies, 
organizations, or even governments, but it is impossible to point to any specific 
„owner‟ of the Net writ large.281 
The logical and legal bases of the notion of enforcement of foreign judgements 
raise one additional difficult question, as to whether such authority is a mere 
concession that the court makes on the grounds of convenience and utility, and not 
as the result of a binding obligation or duty to enforce foreign judgements. In fact, 
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modern analysis of the existence of the equitable jurisdiction on foreign verdicts 
has not been perfectly persuasive in the academic literature, and even cases where 
the courts have contemplated the enforcement of foreign judgments have reached 
mixed results.
282
  
At first glance, the case of Yahoo Inc. v. La Ligue Contre LeRacisme et 
L‟Antisemitisme appears to have paved a new path in the terrain of legal issues 
concerning the internet. In the case a US federal district court for the Northern 
District of California held unenforceable an order of the French court that required 
a California-based Internet Service Provider (ISP), Yahoo Inc., to block French 
citizens‟ access to Nazi material displayed or offered for sale on the ISP‟s US 
website.
283
 At issue was whether it was consistent with the Constitution and laws of 
the US for another nation to regulate speech by a US resident within the US on the 
basis that such speech could be accessed by internet users in that nation.
284
 
Scholars have noted that courts in the US are assumed to enforce foreign country 
injunctions so long as public policy is not offended and there is no undue burden 
on the American court.
285
  
 
13. The Global Nature of the Internet and the Weakness in the Courts’ 
Enforcement Powers on Injunctions 
Today, the chorus of opinion is that the law of privacy has been ineffective, 
particularly in remedying the burgeoning collection, use and dissemination of 
personal information in the “Information Age”.286 The global nature of the internet 
poses jurisdictional challenges, as much of the material accessed from the UK is 
published on servers hosted in foreign domains. The proliferation of online media 
outlets increases the possibility for injunctions to be breached, and offers the 
potential for injuncted information to be spread quickly around the world.
287
   
The challenges posed to injunctions were demonstrated in May 2011 when the 
Giggs injunction was broken by at least one Twitter user and the information 
repeated as many as 75,000 times.
288
 The United Nations Human Rights Council 
acknowledges the conceptual difficulties in this area. It agrees that, „Notably, 
encryption protects the content of communications but not identifying factors such 
as the Internet Protocol (IP) address, known as metadata. Third parties may gather 
significant information concerning an individual‟s identity through metadata 
analysis if the user does not employ anonymity tools‟.289  
The immediate conclusion drawn by the Council is that „Anonymity is the 
condition of avoiding identification‟. Providing further emphasis, the Council 
reasoned that „A common human desire to protect one‟s identity from the crowd, 
anonymity may liberate a user to explore and impart ideas and opinions more than 
she would be using her actual identity‟.290 It maintained that „Individuals online 
may adopt pseudonyms (or, for instance, fake e-mail or social media accounts) to 
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hide their identities, image, voice, location and so forth, but the privacy afforded 
through such pseudonyms is superficial and easily disturbed by Governments or 
others with the necessary expertise; in the absence of combinations of encryption 
and anonymizing tools, the digital traces that users leave behind render their 
identities easily discoverable‟. 291  
The Council‟s analysis was very pragmatic. It notes that „Users seeking to ensure 
full anonymity or mask their identity (such as hiding the original IP address) 
against State or criminal intrusion may use tools such as virtual private networks 
(VPNs), proxy services, anonymizing networks and software, and peer-to-peer 
networks‟. In its conclusion, it found that „One well-known anonymity tool, the 
Tor network, deploys more than 6,000 decentralized computer servers around the 
world to receive and relay data multiple times so as to hide identifying information 
about the end points, creating strong anonymity for its users‟.292 
Some UK-based bloggers prefer their blogs to be physically hosted in the US, in 
order to benefit from the First Amendment protections there.
293
 This is done in 
order to protect the blog against legal action in the UK, which, whilst still possible, 
becomes more difficult and expensive as a result of the overseas hosting.
294
 What 
seems to weaken this thinking further is the fact that the UK has three separate 
legal systems: those of England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. Section 
18(5)(d) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982
295
 provides that an 
interim measure (including an injunction) obtained in one of the UK‟s jurisdictions 
is not enforceable in the other jurisdictions.
296
  
This premise primarily supports the logical contention that in practice the 
jurisdiction of the court in enforcing injunctions faces enforcement difficulty in the 
age of the internet. Generally, any judgement obtained in the High Court in London 
is not enforceable in Scotland or Northern Ireland; separate orders would have to 
be obtained from those jurisdictions registered in specific courts,
297
 except a 
judgement entered under Lugano Convention.
298
 However, final injunctions 
granted in one jurisdiction in the UK can be enforced in the other jurisdictions, by 
virtue of that same Act.
299
  
The Attorney General did not think there was a problem with cross-border 
enforcement with the UK; because separate legal systems are a fundamental part of 
the UK‟s national make-up, there was no way around the issue.300 Parliament also 
takes the view that interim injunctions granted in one jurisdiction in the UK are 
enforceable in the other two jurisdictions in the same way as final injunctions 
are.
301
 This issue arose in the Ryan Giggs case,
302
 where in the absence of a 
Scottish interim injunction (an interdict) the claimant‟s identity was published in 
Scotland.
303
  
The paper added in its editorial column, „Today we identify the footballer whose 
name has been linked to a court super injunction by thousands of postings on 
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Twitter. Why? Because we believe it is unsustainable that the law can be used to 
prevent newspapers from publishing information that readers can access on the 
internet at the click of a mouse‟.304 The Sunday Herald also stated: „We should 
point out immediately that we are not accusing the footballer concerned of any 
misdeed. Whether the allegations against him are true or not has no relevance to 
this debate. The issue is one of freedom of information and of a growing argument 
in favour of more restrictive privacy laws‟.305 The editor of that newspaper said that 
they had not breached the interim injunction because it did not apply in Scotland.
306
  
So, the question is how effective is contempt, as a coercive instrument of the 
judiciary to maintain reasonable public confidence in judicial decisions, which is a 
foundation of the justice system in the age of the internet.
307
 The unfettered space 
enjoyed by the media is further enhanced by essential provisions of the Contempt 
Act 1981, which provides a shield to the reporter, and eventually tilts this balance 
towards freedom of speech. Section 10 dubbed “Sources of information” stipulates 
that:  
No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of 
court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication 
for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court 
that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the 
prevention of disorder or crime.
308
 
More importantly, another threat to celebrity privacy injunctions is the Bill of 
Rights 1689.
309
Article 9 provides that „the Freedom of Speech and Debates or 
Proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or 
Place out of Parliament‟.310 This is usually considered to be a fundamental feature 
of the constitution. It provides the “final legal, recognition” of the constitutional 
principle of legal immunity to parliamentarians.
311
 As a cornerstone of 
parliamentary privilege,
312
 this has customarily been described as the “exclusive 
cognisance of Parliament”.313 Its principal purpose was stated clearly by Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson: 
The plain meaning of Article 9, viewed against the historical background in which 
it was enacted, was to ensure that Members of Parliament were not subjected to 
any penalty, civil or criminal for what they said and were able, contrary to the 
previous assertions of the Stuart monarchy, to discuss what they, as opposed to the 
monarch, chose to discuss.
314
 
The decision of R v Chaytor & Others [2010] 3 WLR reinforced this objective.
315
 It 
follows that what is said or done within the walls of Parliament cannot be inquired 
into in a court of law.
316
 It is not excluded by the presence of malice or fraudulent 
purpose and where the statement appears to be untrue to the knowledge of the 
maker it cannot be made the foundation of civil or criminal proceedings in as much 
as the maker acts honestly and responsibly.
317
 Thus, Article 9 is wide and also 
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absolute.
318
 The exact scope of it has been fully tested and its legitimacy is clear 
even from a European jurisprudence perspective.
319
  
An attempt by the courts to go beyond the constitutional boundary delimited by 
Article 9, as interpreted by the courts, would be unconstitutional.
320
 The Liberal 
Democrat Member of Parliament, John Hemming, who during an urgent House of 
Commons question on privacy orders named Ryan Giggs as the footballer CTB,
321
 
relied on the Article 9 parliamentary privilege in breaking the court order (super 
injunction). He said, „Mr Speaker, with about 75,000 people having named Ryan 
Giggs it is obviously impracticable to imprison them all‟.322  
Even after this point Justice Tugendhat, sitting at the High Court, defiantly ruled 
that the injunction was still valid and should not be lifted, arguing that „this is not 
about secrecy, this is about intrusion‟.323 He added that even if the level of 
protection now offered was limited, it was still potentially worthwhile: „If a court 
can stop one person or five people [from harassing the player] – not 50,000 – is 
there not something to be achieved?‟.324 Nevertheless, despite the intensity of the 
verdict to keep the status quo, the case refused to die until Justice Eady on 15 
December 2011, accepted that, „There is no longer any point in maintaining the 
anonymity‟.325 
The general immunity of the press is further enriched by the normative principle 
enshrined in Section 2 of the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840.
326
 This provision 
grants qualified privilege or immunity to individuals in civil or criminal 
proceedings who publish any extract from or abstract of parliamentary proceedings 
subject only to bona fide and without malice.
327
 This means that when a 
Parliamentarian - like John Hemming in the case of Ryan Giggs - triggers 
immunity under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 the media can report the story 
thereafter on account of the Parliamentarian. Nevertheless, it is an open question as 
to whether publication of any extract from or abstract of Hansard, which had the 
effect of frustrating a court order and was deliberately intended to do so, would be 
held to be in good faith and without malice. However, this question appears to be a 
settled idea.  
The 1999 Joint Committee concluded that „in such circumstances i.e., where an 
injunction barring publicity is in force reporting a matter divulged in parliamentary 
proceedings is strictly a contempt of court‟.328 However, the point is whether this 
report, although persuasive, applies to the print media alone. If not, the question 
that follows is whether it (the report) can operate to undermine Section 2 of the 
Parliamentary Papers Act 1840, which has a statutory force, and more importantly, 
whether in the age of the internet and its cross-border flow of information the 
courts are still willing to undermine their own authority by granting to celebrities‟ 
super-injunctions and anonymised injunctions where the story is visible via social 
media platforms. 
  
  
Manu, T., Moreno, F.R. (2016) 
Is Social Media Challenging the Authority of the Judiciary? Rethinking the Effectiveness of Anonymised and Super 
Injunctions in the Age of the Internet 
 
 
DE GRUYTER 
OPEN 
Journal of legal studies Volume 18 Issue 32/2016 
ISSN 2457-9017; Online ISSN 2392-7054. Web: publicatii.uvvg.ro/index.php/jls. Pages 39-87 
 
66 
 
14. Conclusion 
The right to privacy is, as a legal concept, a fairly recent invention, except that it 
has fast gained jurisprudential momentum.
329
 Notwithstanding this, Danielle Citron 
observes that the privacy laws have severe limitations in combatting internet 
harassment.
330
 The formulation of privacy into a legal doctrine of human rights 
seems to have presented a fundamental tension in relation to freedom of 
expression, which is much older and is a well defended right by the media. As a 
matter of jurisprudential principle, the courts, through a consideration of the law, 
examine the substantive legal issues in terms of a balancing process, whereby the 
interest in privacy is balanced against the interest in freedom of expression. It is 
also a matter of broad standard for the courts to rely on injunctions as ancillary 
instruments of equity in doing justice in this field. 
Significantly, while the elementary norm of an injunction is that it commands an 
act that the court regards as an essential constituent to justice, unfortunately some 
contend that judges have gone beyond this point, and this has already shifted 
opinions. In fact, serious concerns have been expressed about the extent to which 
the rich are easily able to invoke the discretion of the court to grant injunctions in a 
fashion that is in stark contrast to the principle of open justice. Therefore, the 
practice and procedure governing injunctions have come under the spotlight of late 
in civil proceedings. 
Implicit in this understanding is the fact that the internet has had far-reaching 
effects on individual privacy.
331
 The advancement of technology, which has tended 
to remove the traditional publisher‟s role of “gatekeeper”, gives everyone, through 
new media, the opportunity to disseminate information, and to express their 
views.
332
 However, the hallmarks of digital information and the ease of 
informational exchange facilitated by this medium lead to more noxious privacy 
and personality harms than ever before.
333
 Within this view, most commentators 
from the pro-media fraternity submit that mainstream newspapers are invariably 
served with the terms of injunctions granted against newspapers,
334
 as media 
coverage has highlighted the apparent inequity of laws being applied to print and 
broadcast media, which, cannot be enforced in the same way against those 
publishing online.  
While this suspicion and tension is not entirely new to matters of procedural law, 
the recent case, PJS v News Group Newspapers has turned on this controversy. 
Even writers with a social bent can easily spot that there cannot be a proper rule of 
law without an effective judicial system that is capable of enforcing not just rights 
but also decisions using its coercive powers. In other words, the effectiveness of 
the judicial system as the final guarantor of rights crucially depends on the extent 
to which its decisions are enforced. In terms of the injunction‟s effectiveness, it is 
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unlikely that there will ever be a foolproof technical solution able to prevent 
circumventing the effects of this particular type of injunctive relief. Yet, to a great 
extent, the development of the general rule of extraterritorial application of 
injunctions is dictated by reality and necessity.  
Depending on which philosophical spectrum one sits, most writers would agree 
that cross-border transactions on social media have the tendency to complicate 
things simply due to the fact that pursuant to injunctions, the jurisdiction of the 
court is weakened. The current approach appears careless and unsustainable and 
undermines the authority of the judiciary, which has long remained the most 
revered state institution. Therefore, the main conclusion to be drawn from this 
paper is that since these injunctions cannot be considered able to achieve their aim, 
or put differently, are clearly ineffective in achieving them, it is arguable that they 
cannot be considered appropriate, necessary or proportionate, so they may be 
illegitimate.   
Thus, perhaps the time has come for the government to acknowledge that „it is 
absurd to hold back the flow of information in the digital age by using a court order 
that can only go as far as Hadrian‟s Wall‟.335 On the contrary, the violation of 
users‟ freedom of expression by the government, will be routine, disproportionate 
and illegal and this could potentially open up the door to a new era of legal 
challenges in the UK. However, no matter how sophisticated the injunctions 
granted, opposition from users will eventually lead to strategies to bypass their 
effectiveness being deployed and improved for instance, by using anonymity tools 
such as virtual private networks, proxy services or Tor. 
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